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Abstract. The landscape of the World Wide Web today consists of a
vast amount of services. While most of them are offered for free, the
service providers prohibit their malicious usage by automated scripts.
To enforce this policy, Captchas have emerged as a reliable method to
setup a Turing test to distinguish between human and computers. Image
recognition Captchas as one type of Captchas promise high human
success rates. In this paper however, we develop an successful approach
to attack this type of Captcha. To evaluate our attack we implemented
a publicly available tool, which delivers promising results for the Huma-
nAuth Captcha and others. Based upon our findings we propose several
techniques for improving future versions of image recognition Captchas.
Keywords: Captcha, Image Recognition Captcha, HumanAuth, Ex-
perimentations, Security Analysis.
1 Introduction
Today’s highly networked world is based on a vast amount of electronic services
provided and requested via the world wide web. A large number of these services,
i.e. e-mail and social networks, is available free of charge, solely requiring the
user to register with the service provider. Yet the last decade has shown an
increasing interest in abusing Internet services for malicious economical reasons.
E-mail accounts, frequently available free of charge after initial registration, are
misused for sending SPAM and phising mails to a plethora of plagued Internet
users. There are still many more impermissible but still feasible and reasonably
economic ways to abuse services trough the Internet.
To prevent corruptive usage of these services by automated scripts and thereby
mitigate the threads illustrated above, in the majority of cases it is sufficient to
remotely distinguish between humans and machines. Different approaches for
such so-called Turing tests, generally known as Captchas1, HIPs2 or POSHs3
1 Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart.
2 Human Interactive Proof.
3 Puzzle Only Solvable by Humans.
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have been proposed and are currently under active development and deployed to
various systems. All of them are built upon problems that can easily be solved
by humans but are very hard for machines to solve. Likewise, problems that
emerged to be very hard challenges in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) are
often implemented in one form or another into Captchas.
In this paper we present an approach, that does not try to solve the hard AI
problem behind Captchas but forges a different solution, also known as side-
channel attack. We focus on elementary image processing and color value distri-
bution calculations to precompute characteristic attributes for all images of the
chosen image recognition Captcha implementation. Based on these character-
istic attributes, our approach is able to recognize randomly distorted Captcha
images with impressive precision. We evaluated the applicability of our approach
against several implementations (HumanAuth, MicrosoftAsirra,UMISTFaces)
to prove its reliability.
The main contributions of this paper are the following: We develop an attack
on image recognition Captchas, called PixelMap. We evaluate our approach, at-
tacking several image recognition Captchas with very promising results. Based
upon our findings we propose several techniques to harden future image recogni-
tion Captchas from being vulnerable to this kind of attacks. Furthermore we
implemented a prototype tool to show the practical applicability of the presented
approach.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: We start in Chapter 2
with an overview of related work and other approaches for automatically solving
Captchas. Subsequently, in Chapter 3 we briefly explain the general Captcha
approach and different kinds of Captchas before we comprehensively introduce
and evaluate our approach for attacking image recognition Captchas in general
and the HumanAuth scheme in particular in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 we infer
ideas for both, improving our attack and tweaking image modification procedures
to impede future attacks. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes our findings.
2 Related Work
The first thoughts related to the field of ‘Automated Turing Tests’ were written
down by Naor in 1997 [9]. Since the introduction of the term Captcha by von
Ahn et al. [12] a wide variety of Captchas showing different characteristics
have been developed. Banday and Sha differ between three classes: Text-based
(OCR), image-based and audio-based captchas [1]. As Captchas are used for
security purposes, different attack-schemes have emerged. Most attacks are based
on OCR, meaning that they try to solve the underlying AI problem [8], [7], [14].
Furthermore, side-channel attacks exist trying to circumvent the AI prob-
lem. For example, Hernandez-Castro et al. propose a side-channel attack scheme
on Microsoft’s image-recognition based Captcha Asirra [6] and the Huma-
nAuth Captcha (see Chapter 3.2), using different statistical test on the Asirra
database and the HumanAuth image library. In [5] another attack on Asirra
Attacking Image Recognition Captchas 15
has been published, using support vector machines together with color and text
processing for classification.
Yan and El Ahmad published an attack, using both, side-channel techniques as
well as tackling the AI-problem, on an OCR-resistant text-based Captcha [16].
The authors combine different techniques: First, they automatically separate
foreground text from background to perform a text-segmentation. By counting
the number of foreground pixels in each segment, they are able to identify char-
acters according to an unique pixel count in most of the time, using a dictionary
approach additionally in order to reveal unidentified characters.
3 Captcha – A Modern Kind of Turing-Test?
In the following we shortly lay out background and implementation of different
kinds of Captchas before we briefly pick up image recognition Captchas and
HumanAuth as the implementation we attacked in particular.
3.1 Background and Alternatives
A Captcha is defined as a challenge-response test, generated by a computer,
that only a human can solve. Hence Captchas are suitable to prevent corrup-
tive usage of web services by automated scripts. Since Ahn et al. [12] proposed
the concept of Captchas, industry and researchers have developed a variety
of different Captchas. Usually Captchas are based on the three principles
developed by Chew and Tygar [3]: (1) Easy for humans to solve. (2) Hard for
computers to solve. (3) Easy to generate and verify.
Hard artificial intelligence (AI) problems are often used to constructCaptchas
fulfilling the first and the second principle. Those problems are difficult to solve
without special knowledge, i.e. the problem context, which is usually available to
humans but not to computers. Several types of Captchas exist relying on various
human sensory abilities, such as seeing and hearing.
The third principle is hard to fulfill. Similar to cryptographic functions and
for security reasons, the algorithm to create a Captcha is usually publicly avail-
able. Therefore a Captcha generation algorithm must be able to quickly create
a large number of unpredictable tests. Furthermore, the verification algorithm
must know the solution a priori, since the verification is done by a computer
that itself cannot solve the generated Captcha.
To solve the verification problem two types of Captchas have emerged [4]:
Algorithm- and database-based Captchas. The first uses an algorithm that is
initialized with a secret random number to derive a challenge, allowing the verifi-
cation to prove or disprove the test response. Thus the security and effectiveness
for this type of Captchas depends on the secrecy of the random number. The
second type employs a large database of preclassified challenges and an algorithm
to randomly select single challenges. Using the classification, the verification al-
gorithm can evaluate the test response.
The underlying principle of the most widespread type of Captchas is optical
character recognition (OCR). The correct identification of characters in an image
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(a) Google Captcha (b) Unreadable CAPTCHA
Fig. 1. OCR-based Captchas
is a hard AI problem, especially if the characters are distorted (see Figure 1(a)).
Using the definition introduced above, OCR Captchas are usually algorithm-
based. The advantage of this type of Captcha is the ability to easily generate
a large number of text strings, that are distorted and displayed as a Captcha.
However this approach has a major shortcoming. Text with minimal distortion
is easily readable by current OCR algorithms. Introducing more noise makes
the Captcha very hard to solve even for humans (see Figure 1(b)) [15]. Thus
there is a small gap between human and non-human success rates [4] and human
computer interaction (HCI) research is heavily involved.
To overcome the shortcomings of OCR-based Captchas, several approaches
have been proposed using different types of AI problems, such as the recognition
of spoken letters (so-called audio Captchas) and image classification.
3.2 Image Recognition Captchas
Chew and Tygar [3] were among the first to use images (usually photographs) to
create a new type of Captchas, called image Captcha. While several variations
of image Captchas exist, the kind we focus on – image recognition Captchas
– requires to understand what is depicted on an image which constitutes a hard
AI problem [2]. Image recognition Captchas are usually database-based, thus
requiring a database of preclassified images. Microsoft’s Asirra is a well-known
example [4]. Asirra presents a list of cat and dog images, asking the user to
identify the cat images.
Studies indicate that the biggest advantage of image recognition Captchas
is the improved human success rate compared to OCR-based Captchas [3],
[4]. The main shortcoming is the dependency on a database of images that are
preclassified by humans. Furthermore the database needs to be large and updated
frequently with new images. Otherwise an adversary can create hashes of all
images (similar to the rainbow table approach in cryptography [10]) and lookup
a questioned image hash in his database.
3.3 The HumanAuth Captcha
HumanAuth4 is an image recognition Captcha implementation, written in PHP
and released under the GPL version 2 license. It presents to the user nine images
chosen from an enclosed image database, three of them being nature and the
4 http://sourceforge.net/projects/humanauth/
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other six images being nonnature images. To solve the Captcha, the user has
to select the three nature images. HumanAuth constitutes a hard AI problem as
the user has to understand what the images represent.
In order to protect from side-channel attacks, HumanAuth places a randomly
positioned watermark on every image, rendering a precalculation of image hashes
for each image in the database useless.
4 PixelMap – An Approach to Attack Image Captchas
Within this section we present PixelMap as our approach to attack image recog-
nition Captchas, especially the previously mentioned HumanAuth implementa-
tion. The basic idea behind PixelMap is that even distorted images are at least
very similar for the better part of the image area.
4.1 General Approach
Based on a Captcha’s freely available database of categorized source images
(the learn images), we first pre-calculate a characteristic and distinguishing at-
tribute, our so-called PixelMap (see Section 4.2) for each image (step 1 in Figure
2). To automatically solve a Captcha, we calculate the PixelMap for each of the
‘test images’ (step 2 in Figure 2) and compare it to the pre-calculated PixelMaps
of the original image database (step 3 in Figure 2). This comparison detects the
‘learn image’ which is most similar to the current test image. We know the learn
image’s category from the learning phase and assume the same classification for
the test image. For the HumanAuth example this means that we finally pick a
test image as nature image if the most similar learn image is classified as nature
and vice versa.
7 7 2
1 5 4
1 6 2
1 5 4 8 31 5 4
PixelMap
CAPTCHA PixelMap 5 8 21 6 4
Compare =
1
2
3
Fig. 2. PixelMap – Approach Outline
Please note that the image comparison has to be conducted in a fuzzy manner
as the test image is distorted in some way or another, for example by an overlaid
watermark. These image distortions however, do regularly not affect the whole
image but only a minor part of the image area. Our analysis has shown that
throughout the remaining image area, corresponding learn and test are at least
very similar if not completely identical.
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4.2 Fuzzy Image Recognition Algorithm
Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 show the foundations of our fuzzy image comparison
approach. As mentioned above, we calculate a PixelMap based on which we
compare two images fuzzily.
Algorithm 1. Image Classification Algorithm
function computePixelMap(img)
pixelMap← ARRAY [img.WIDTH ∗ img.HEIGHT ]
k ← 0
for all pxl ∈ img do
pixelMap[k] ← pxl.ALPHA + pxl.RED + pxl.GREEN + pxl.BLUE
k ← k + 1
end for
return pixelMap
end function
Each single pixel of an image consists of red, green, blue (RGB) and alpha
values. The mixture of the RGB-values establishes the color of the pixel while
the alpha value represents its transparency. All four values vary within the range
from 0 to 255. Our PixelMap is simply calculated by summing up the RGB and
alpha values for each single pixel of an image, resulting in a sum between 0
and 1020. For example a purely red pixel thus gets the value 510 as its red
value is 255, its alpha value is as well 255 because pixel opacity is 100%, and
the remaining green and blue values are 0. Please note that consequently the
resulting PixelMaps for i.e. purely red and purely green images do not differ
but are exactly identical. Algorithm 1 shows the calculation of the PixelMap
in pseudo code. This PixelMap is pre-calculated and cached together with the
classification for each undistored image of the underlying image database.
Algorithm 2. Image Identification Algorithm
1: function uncoverImage(testimg, img_class_db)
2: max_sim_img
3: max_sim ← 0
4: for all img ∈ img_class_db do
5: sim ←CompareImages(testimg, img)
6: if sim > max_sim then
7: max_sim_img ← img
8: max_sim ← sim
9: end if
10: end for
11: return max_sim_img
12: end function
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To uncover the classification of a test image, we check it against the image
database. Algorithm 2 shows the basic procedure. Based on its previously cal-
culated PixelMap we compare the possibly distorted test image fuzzily against
each single undistorted learn image in the image database. As a result we receive
the most similar learn image from which we know its classification.
Algorithm 3. Fuzzy Image Comparison Algorithm
1: function compareImages(img1, img2)
2: no_identical_pxls← 0
3: for all pxl_id1 ∈ img1 and pxl_id2 ∈ img2 do
4: sim ← Compare(pxl_id1, pxl_id2)
5: if sim < THRESHOLD then
6: no_identical_pxls← no_identical_pxls + 1
7: end if
8: end for
9: return (no_identical_pxls/all_pxl)
10: end function
Finally, the pseudo code of our unpretentious image comparison algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 3. It simply accepts two images as inputs which are fuzzily
compared pixel by pixel based on the values of their PixelMaps. The fuzziness is
implemented by a threshold which defines by which amount the pixel values of a
single pixel in both images may differ before this pixel is rated as not matching.
For our current approach a threshold of 20, which is about 2 percent of the
maximum pixel sum, shaped up as suitable from several tests. The fuzzy image
comparison algorithm simply returns the percentage of pixels that are similar
between both images within the defined threshold.
As a result of these three fundamental building blocks of our image comparison
approach, we receive for each distorted test image the unmodified image that is
most similar to it together with its classification and a numeric similarity value
ranging between 0-100 percent. Figure 3(a) shows the result in a graphical form.
The abscissa marks all images, i.e. nature and non-nature images, from the image
database while the ordinate marks the similarity of the test image to each of
the learn images. Figure 3(a) is calculated using the original HumanAuth image
database and a test image generated by the original HumanAuth implementation
therefore containing a watermark. As can be seen from the graph, the similarity
between the test image and the learn image most similar to it is about 85 percent.
In other words, almost 85 percent of all pixels of the learn and the test image
do not vary more then the previously defined threshold. Of particular interest
is the significant gap between the similarity to the single most similar image
(the peak in Figure 3(a)) and the much smaller similarity to all all other images.
This result suggests that test images have to be distorted significantly before
our algorithm does no longer accurately match correct test and base images (see
Figure 6).
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4.3 Evaluation
As we have shown in Figure 3(a), our image identification approach quite clearly
identifies single distorted images based on the HumanAuth Captcha implemen-
tation. To evaluate our approach in more detail, we checked it more accurately
against HumanAuth and applied it to several other Captcha image databases.
To effectively evaluate our approach, we implemented a HumanAuth simu-
lator within our prototype (see Section 4.4). The simulator randomly choses 3
nature and 6 non-nature images from the image database and embeds the Huma-
nAuth default watermark using the default opacity. In a second step we fed these
distorted images into our image identification algorithm from which we receive
the 9 most similar undistorted images. Finally, we checked whether the correct
undistorted images have been uncovered. If and only if (a) the 3 nature im-
ages have been uncovered correctly as nature images and (b) no further actually
non-nature image has wrongly been classified as nature image, the Captcha is
solved correctly. Figure 3(b) shows the results for one hundred simulator rounds
(marked on the abscissa). The lower dotted black line shows the minimum simi-
larity of correctly identified nature images to the image it has been derived from.
The upper dashed blue line shows the success rate for solving the HumanAuth
Captcha, i.e. the percentage of correctly classified distorted nature images. As
can easily be seen, our approach exhibits a 100 percent accuracy for the default
HumanAuth settings. These results remained stable for several test runs with
randomly selected images and watermark positions.
(a) Similarity between Distorted Test Im-
age and Original Base Images
(b) Image Identification Results from our
Simulator
Fig. 3. Evaluation of the Image Identification Algorithm
Please note that for solving the HumanAuth Captcha it is not essential to
correctly identify the base image of each distorted image. It rather suffices to
correctly classify each image correctly as (non-)nature even if the correct base
image is not uncovered. In case our algorithm uncovered an image as a nature
one but not as the correct base image, Figure 3(b) would have shown an spacious
dashed red line below the blue one.
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Additionally, we performed a broader evaluation against two more image
databases, Microsoft’s Asirra5 and the Umist Faces database6. We applied
our attack on a publicly available excerpt of the Asirra database, which con-
tains 30000 images. The large amount of images leads to a higher similarity
among the images. However since the images are not modified, this does not
affect our fuzzy image comparison algorithm. The Umist Faces database con-
sists of black and white images, showing peoples’ faces photographed in front
of a white background. This setting implies that large parts are similar for all
images. However, identical pixels, i.e. the pixels showing a white background are
implicitly ignored by our algorithm, leaving the rest of the image for comparison.
Hence the results of our attack on this database are identical to attack on the
HumanAuth database.
4.4 Prototypical Implementation
We have implemented a prototype to attack image recognition Captchas. The
prototype is available for download and testing on our Web site7. We integrated
the HumanAuth images as a sample image database to allow a broad audience
to easily evaluate the tool. The prototype comes with a variety of functions that
are shortly explained hereafter.
Figure 4 depicts the HumanAuth solver which allows solving Captchas cre-
ated by an arbitrary HumanAuth instance. Our prototype fetches the images
from a HumanAuth instance we set up at our Web site8 (see Figure 4(a)) and
can easily solve it using our PixelMap approach (see Figure 4(b)).
Furthermore, to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach we implemented a
generic Captcha simulator. This allows for rapdily testing our attack against all
database-based Captcha with an arbitrary number of iterations. The simulator
also implements a variety of image modification functions to test the success rate
of our approach against hardened Captcha instances.
For analytical reasons the prototype also contains image comparison function-
alities to examine our PixelMap approach in a controlled environment. Analo-
gous to the simulator it also implements the image modification functions. To
enable an in-depth analysis of the results, most functions allow for a graph visu-
alization (see for instance Figure 3(a) and 3(b)).
5 Ideas for Improvement and Future Work
Based on the results of our current PixelMap approach depicted in Chapter 4
we identified several ideas for both improving our attack and improving image
choice and distortion to generate improved Captchas. These ideas are described
shortly in the following.
5 http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/Asirra/corpus.aspx
6 http://www.shef.ac.uk/eee/research/vie/research/face.html
7 http://www-ifsresearch.wiwi.uni-regensburg.de/paper/captcha/solver/
8 http://www-ifsresearch.wiwi.uni-regensburg.de/paper/captcha/humanauth/
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(a) Fetched Captcha Challenges (b) Correctly Identified Nature Images
Fig. 4. IFS Captcha Solver
5.1 Improving the Attack
Although delivering promising results compared to other approaches [6], we iden-
tified several starting points for improving our approach. As stated in Section 3.2,
a major shortcoming of many image Captchas is the dependency on a preclas-
sified image database. In the majority of cases the image database is packaged
with the Captcha and thus available to an attacker. Other types of Captchas,
such as Asirra [4] are based on a secret image database which is constantly be-
ing extended by new images. To prove the general applicability of our approach,
we sketch two strategies to attack this second kind of Captchas.
Using the secrecy of the image database as the main pillar for the security
of a Captcha protects only poorly from exploitation by an attacker. Unlike
classical cryptosystems where the key remains always secret, a Captcha reveals
a small portion of its database each time a new test is created and new images
are displayed. An attacker is able to store these images and classify them e.g.
using a crowd-sourcing approach such as the ESP Game [13]. This process can
be repeated until the whole database is downloaded and classified, making the
Captcha fully exploitable with our approach. Thus the security solely depends
on the increased effort to reconstruct the secret database, rendering the security
of this type of Captcha an economical question.
Another strategy to attack secret database Captchas without the need to
download the whole image database might be used to correctly classify previ-
ously unclassified images. Based on our PixelMap approach, we examined the
color distribution of the HumanAuth images and found an interesting property.
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(a) Nature Images (b) Nonnature Images
Fig. 5. RGB Value Frequency for HumanAuth Nature and Nonnature Images
Figure 5 depicts the cumulated and aggregated RGB value frequency for na-
ture and non-nature images. The abscissa contains the cumulated, i.e. Alpha +
Red + Green + Blue values and the ordinate holds frequency of those values
among all images in the database. While both graphs in Figure 5 show a similar
aggregated RGB value frequency the peak between 410 and 430 on the abscissa
is evident. Nature images contain an above-average frequency of a certain small
range of RGB values, which is reducible to their high portion of green and/or
blue pixels. Using this characteristic property a fuzzy image comparison algo-
rithm might be employed to classify previously unknown images. This approach
is slightly similar to a method for classifying images in two semantic classes,
namely photographs and graphics developed by Oliviera et al. [11].
5.2 Improving Image Choices
Section 3.2 identified a public image database as one of the major shortcomings of
many image recognition Captchas like HumanAuth making them vulnerable to
our attack. Furthermore in Section 5.1 we demonstrated the general applicability
of our approach even for secret image database Captchas. In this section, we
outline several improvements for image Captchas preventing fuzzy classification
attacks like our PixelMap approach.
It must be acknowledged that an attacker can always obtain the image database
and preclassify all images. Therefore the security of image Captchas must not
depend on the image database at all. To effectively improve the security of image
recognition Captchas, preclassification of all images and all potential variations
and modifications thereof has to be uneconomically.
We propose to randomly modify each image using several image modification
algorithms simultaneously. A randomly placed watermark prevents hashtable
attacks, since the hash of an image is different for each position of the watermark.
However we have showen in Section 4.2 that a watermark alone does not protect
from fuzzy image classification. To improve that, we propose a combination of
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(a) Image Recognition Rate After Slight
Zoom
(b) Combined Variation of Several Param-
eters
Fig. 6. Image Modification Improvements Applied
several image modification algorithms: Watermark size, watermark alpha, image
zoom, image alpha, image color and image flip. Figure 6(a) depicts the similarity
of a slightly zoomed test image to all other images. Please note the decrease in
similarity from 85 percent for original HumanAuth images (see Figure 3(a)) to
30 percent after applying our image modification techniques. As a result the
previously evident gap between similarities of the test image and the single most
similar image is nonexistent.
The combined application of several image modification algorithms creates
a slight variation of the original image which is still easily recognizable by hu-
mans. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we implemented a modified
version of the HumanAuth Captcha that applies the proposed image modifica-
tion algorithms. Figure 6(b) depicts the associated success rate for our modified
HumanAuth implementation. Compared to the original HumanAuth, where the
success rate of our attack is 100 percent, the modified version of HumanAuth
lowers the success rate depending on the applied image modifications to 0-3
percent. Further iterations show that these results remain stable.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we present PixelMap, a side-channel attack on image recognition
Captchas. Based on a fuzzy image comparison, our approach clearly identi-
fies the shortcomings of several currently existing image recongition Captchas.
To evaluate our approach we applied our attack on several image recognition
Captchas, especially on HumanAuth with very promising results. We imple-
mented a prototype tool that is available for download to demonstrate the prac-
tical applicability of our attack. Building upon our findings we develop several
image modification techniques to protect future versions of image recognition
Captchas, preventing image preclassification while not having an impact on
human recognition success rates.
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